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The existence of involuntary unemployment has long been recognized as one
the main ills of modern industrialized economies. And the rise in unem-
ployment that invariably accompanies all economic downturns is, arguably,
one of the main reasons why cyclical ﬂuctuations are generally viewed as
undesirable.
Despite the central role of unemployment in the policy debate, that
variable has been—at least until recently—conspicuously absent from the new
generation of models that have become the workhorse for the analysis of
monetary policy, inﬂation and the business cycle, and which are generally
referred to as New Keynesian.1 That absence may be justiﬁed on the grounds
that explaining unemployment and its variations has never been the focus of
that literature, so there was no need to model that phenomenon explicitly.
But this could be interpreted as suggesting that there is no independent
role for unemployment—as distinguished, say, from measures of output or
employment—as a determinant of inﬂation (or other macro variables) or as
a variable that central banks should be concerned about and even respond
to in a systematic way. In other words, under the previous view, unem-
ployment and the frictions underlying it are not essential for understanding
ﬂuctuations in nominal and real variables, nor a key ingredient in the design
of monetary policy.2
1The reader can ﬁnd a textbook exposition of the New Keynesian model in Walsh
(2003), Woodford (2003), and Galí (2008). An early version and analysis of the baseline
New Keynesian model can be found in Yun (1996), who used a discrete-time version of
the staggered price-setting model originally developed in Calvo (1983). King and Wolman
(1996) provided a detailed analysis of the steady state and dynamic properties of the
model. Goodfriend and King (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Clarida, Galí
and Gertler (1999) were among the ﬁrst to conduct a normative policy analysis using that
framework.
2The term "unemployment" cannot be found in the index of Walsh (2003) or Woodford
1On the other hand, understanding the determinants of unemployment
and the nature of its ﬂuctuations has been at the heart of a parallel liter-
ature, one that has built on search and matching models in the Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides tradition.3 Since the inﬂuential work of Hall (2005)
and Shimer (2005), pointing to the diﬃculties of a calibrated version of such
a model to account for the size of observed ﬂuctuations in unemployment
and other labor market variables, that literature has taken a more quantita-
tive turn and sparked the interest of mainstream macroeconomists. Yet, and
at least until recently, the models used in that literature have been purely
real, and hence they had nothing to say about the role of monetary policy,
either as a source of unemployment ﬂuctuations, or as a tool to stabilize
those ﬂuctuations.4
Over the past few years, however, a growing number of researchers have
turned their attention towards the development and analysis of frameworks
that combine elements from the two traditions described above. The typical
framework in this literature combines the nominal rigidities and consequent
monetary non-neutralities of New Keynesian models with the real frictions
in labor markets that are characteristic of the search and matching models.
To the extent of my knowledge, Chéron and Langot (2000) were the ﬁrst to
bring together nominal rigidities and labor market frictions, showing how
the resulting framework could generate both a Beveridge curve (a negative
(2003), two textbooks providing a modern treatment of monetary economics. In Galí
(2008) I brieﬂy mention "unemployment" in the concluding chapte, but only in reference
to the recent extensions of the New Keynesian model discussed in the present paper.
3Early contributions to the current vintage of search and matching models include
Diamond (1982 a,b), Mortensen (1982 a,b) and Pissarides (1984). See Pissarides (2000)
for a comprehensive exposition of the search and matching approach.
4Incidentally, it is worth pointing out that standard RBC models share the shortcom-
ings of both paradigms: they neither can explain involuntary unemployment nor have any
role for monetary policy.
2correlation between vacancies and unemployment) and a Phillips curve (a
negative correlation between inﬂation and unemployment) in the presence
of both technology and monetary shocks. Subsequently, Walsh (2003, 2005)
and Trigari (2009) analyzed the impact of embedding labor market frictions
into the basic New Keynesian model with sticky prices but ﬂexible wages,
with a focus on the size and persistence of the eﬀects of monetary policy
shocks.
More recent contributions have extended that work in two dimensions.
First, they have relaxed the assumption of ﬂexible wages, and introduced
diﬀerent forms of nominal and real wage rigidity. The work of Trigari (2006)
and Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005) fall into that category. Secondly, the focus
of analysis has gradually turned to normative issues, and more speciﬁcally, to
the implications of labor market frictions and unemployment for the design
of monetary policy. Thus, the work of Blanchard and Galí (2010) (in a
model with real wage rigidities) and Thomas (2008) (under nominal wage
rigidities) provides an explicit analysis of the optimal monetary policy in
the context of a simple New Keynesian model with labor market frictions.5
As argued below, and perhaps not surprisingly, those two extensions are
not unrelated: the presence of wage rigidities has important implications,
not only for the macroeconomic eﬀects of diﬀerent shocks, but also for the
relative desirability of alternative policies.
While still in its infancy, the abovementioned literature has already pro-
vided some insights of interest and has laid the ground for a possible "evolu-
tion" of the estimated DSGE models currently used for policy analysis, one
that would introduce labor market frictions and unemployment explicitly in
5See also the analysis in Arseneau and Chugh (2008) in a model with ﬂexible prices
and quadratic costs of nominal wage adjustment.
3the full-ﬂedged monetary models of the kind originally developed by Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2008).
The recent work of Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) provides an excellent
illustration of the progress being made in that direction.
The objective of the present paper is twofold. First, to describe some of
the essential ingredients of a model that combines labor market frictions and
nominal rigidities. And, secondly, to illustrate how such a model can be used
to address questions of interest pertaining to the interaction between labor
market frictions and nominal rigidities. Two broad questions are emphasized
in the analysis below:
• What is the role of labor market frictions in shaping the economy’s
response to aggregate shocks?
• What are the implications of those frictions for the design of monetary
policy? In particular, should central banks pay attention to unemploy-
ment when setting interest rates?
In order to address those questions, I develop an extension of the New
Keynesian model that allows for labor market frictions and unemployment.
The model is highly stylized, combining elements found in existing papers,
but abstracting from ingredients that (in my view) are not essential given
the purpose at hand. Relative to the relevant literature, the main novelty
of the framework developed here lies in the introduction of variable labor
market participation. That feature is meant to overcome the surprising
contrast between the importance given by the New Keynesian literature to
the elasticity of labor supply (e.g. as a determinant of the persistence of the
eﬀects of monetary policy shocks) and the assumption of a fully inelastic
4labor supply found almost invariably in existing models with labor market
frictions. In the latter, changes in unemployment match one-for-one those in
employment (with the opposite sign), so there is no information contained in
measures of unemployment that is not revealed by observing employment.
Several lessons emerge from the analysis below, which are summarized
next in the form of bullet points.
• Quantitatively realistic labor market frictions are likely to have, by
themselves, a limited eﬀect on the economy’s equilibrium dynamics.
Instead, their main role is "to make room" for wage rigidities, with the
latter leading to ineﬃcient responses to shocks and signiﬁcant trade-
oﬀsf o rm o n e t a r yp o l i c y .
• When combined with a realistic Taylor-type rule, the introduction of
price rigidities in a model with labor market frictions has a limited
impact on the economy’s equilibrium response to real shocks (though,
of course, it is suﬃcient to make monetary policy non-neutral).
• If the conditions that guarantee the eﬃciency of the steady state are
assumed, the optimal policy under ﬂexible wages (i.e. wages subject to
period-by-period Nash bargaining) is one of strict inﬂation targeting,
which requires that the price level be stabilized at all times. If, instead,
nominal wages are bargained over and readjusted infrequently, the
optimal policy involves moderate deviations from price stability and
can be approximated well by a simple interest rate rule that responds
to price inﬂation with a coeﬃcient of about 15.
• Deviations in the unemployment rate from its eﬃcient level are gen-
erally a source of welfare losses above and beyond those generated by
5ﬂuctuations in the output or employment gaps. An optimized simple
interest rate rule calls for a systematic (though relatively weak) stabi-
lizing policy response to ineﬃcient ﬂuctuations in unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some evidence on
the cyclical behavior of labor market variables and inﬂation, as well as a
simple structural interpretation of their ﬂuctuations. Section 3 develops a
baseline model with labor market frictions and price rigidities, allowing for
two alternative wage-setting environments (ﬂexible and sticky wages). Sec-
tion 4 discusses the properties of a calibrated version of the model, focusing
on the implied responses to monetary and technology shocks. Section 5
presents the welfare criterion associated with the model under the assump-
tion of an eﬃcient steady state, and discusses the responses to a technology
shock under the optimal monetary policy and the optimal simple rule. Sec-
tion 6 discusses possible model extensions. Section 7 concludes. References
and discussion of the relevant literature can generally be found at the end
of each section.
2 Evidence on the Cyclical Behavior of Labor Mar-
ket Variables and Inﬂation
This section summarizes the cyclical properties of employment, the labor
force, the unemployment rate, the real wage and inﬂa t i o ni nt h ep o s t w a rU . S .
economy. I use quarterly data corresponding to the sample period 1948Q1-
2008Q4 and drawn from the HAVER database. GDP is taken to be the
benchmark cyclical indicator. As a wage measure I use hourly compensation
in the nonfarm business sector. The GDP deﬂator is the price level used to
compute inﬂation and the real wage. Employment, the labor force, and GDP
6are normalized by working age population and, together with the real wage,
are expressed in natural logarithms. All variables are detrended using a
band-pass ﬁlter that seeks to preserve ﬂuctuations with a periodicity between
6a n d3 2q u a r t e r s .
The ﬁrst panel of Table 1 reports two key unconditional second moments
for the cyclical component of each variable: its standard deviation relative
to GDP and its correlation with GDP. Many of the facts reported here are
well known but are summarized here as a reminder. Thus, note that employ-
ment is substantially more volatile than the labor force, with unemployment
lying somewhere in between. The real wage is also shown to be substantially
less volatile than GDP. Turning to the correlation with GDP, we see that
both employment and the labor force are procyclical, though the latter only
moderately so (their respective correlations are 083 and 030). The unem-
ployment rate is highly countercyclical, with a correlation with GDP close
to −09.P r i c ei n ﬂation is mildly procyclical, but the real wage is essentially
acyclical.
In addition to the unconditional statistics just summarized, Table 1 also
reports conditional statistics based on a decomposition of each variable into
"technology-driven" and "demand-driven" components. The decomposition
is based on a partially-identiﬁed VAR with ﬁve variables: (log) labor pro-
ductivity, (log) employment, the unemployment rate, price inﬂation and the
average price markup. The latter is computed as the diﬀerence between
(log) labor productivity and the (log) real wage.6 Following the strategy
proposed in Galí (1999), I identify technology shocks as the only source of
6The baseline results discussed below are based on a speciﬁcation of the VAR with
(log) employment in ﬁrst diﬀerences and the unemployment rate detrended using a second
order polynomial of time. The main ﬁndings are robust to an alternative speciﬁcation with
employment detrended in log-levels.
7the unit root in labor productivity. The structural VAR contains four addi-
tional shocks that are left unidentiﬁed, and referred to loosely as "demand"
shocks. I deﬁne the "demand" component of each variable of interest as the
sum of its components associated with each of those four shocks.7
The second and third panels in Table 1 report some statistics of inter-
est for the demand and technology components of a number of variables,
computed after detrending the estimated components with a band-pass ﬁl-
ter analogous to the one applied earlier to the raw data. Note that the
conditional second moments associated with the demand-driven component
are very similar to the unconditional second moments. This is not surpris-
ing once one realizes that non-technology shocks account for the bulk of
the volatility of the cyclical component of all variables (statistics not shown
here). The only exception lies in the strong negative correlation between
the real wage and GDP conditional on demand shocks, which contrasts with
the near zero unconditional correlation between the same variables.
The conditional statistics associated with the technology-driven compo-
nents are shown in the third panel of Table 1. Note that the labor force is now
largely acyclical and the real wage mildly procyclical, both of which contrast
with the corresponding unconditional statistics. Also, while the technology
components of employment and the unemployment rate are shown to be pro-
cyclical and countercyclical, as measured by the corresponding correlation
with GDP, a look at the estimated dynamic responses of those variables
to a technology shock reveals a more complex pattern. Figure 1 displays
the estimated responses to a favorable technology shock, i.e. one which is
shown to increase output and labor productivity permanently. Note that
7The reader is referred to Galí (1999) for a detailed description of the econometric
approach.
8output hardly changes in the short run, with its response building up only
gradually over time. On the other hand, employment declines on impact in
response to that shock, and only gradually reverts back to its initial level.
A similar result can be found in Galí (1999), Basu, Fernald and Kimball
(2006), Francis and Ramey (2005), and Galí and Rabanal (2004), among
others, using alternative VAR speciﬁcations (and with a focus on hours
rather than employment).8 The previous authors have argued that such
estimated responses to a technology shock are at odds with the predictions
of a standard calibrated real business cycle model, which would call for a
simultaneous upward adjustment of output and employment in response to
a technology improvement. The existence of short-run demand constraints,
possibly resulting from the interaction of nominal rigidities and a not-fully-
accommodating monetary policy, has been posited as an explanation for
that evidence.
Figure 1 also provides evidence on the response of variables other than
output and employment to a positive technology shock. In particular we see
that the labor force declines slightly but permanently after that shock. That
decline in the labor force can only oﬀset partially the larger fall the large drop
in employment, thus leading to a persistent increase in the unemployment
rate, which is only reverted after six quarters. Similar evidence of a short
run rise in unemployment in response to a positive supply shock can also be
found Blanchard and Quah (1989) and, more recently, by Barnichon (2008).
The latter author argues that such evidence implies a rejection of a central
prediction of the standard search and matching model, though it can be
8The previous evidence is not uncontroversial. For a critical perspective on that evi-
dence see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2003) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2008).
9accounted for once that model is extended to allow for nominal rigidities
and a suitable monetary policy rule.
Next I explore whether a model that combines nominal rigidities and
labor market frictions can account for diﬀerent aspects of the evidence just
described.
3 A Model with Nominal Rigidities and Labor
Market Frictions
3.1 Households
I assume a large number of identical households. Each household is made
up of a continuum of members represented by the unit interval. There is
assumed to be full consumption risk sharing within each household.9 The










−1 is an index
of the quantities consumed of the diﬀerent types of ﬁnal goods, and  is an
index of the total eﬀort or time that household members allocate to labor
market activities. More speciﬁcally, I deﬁne  as
 =  +  (2)
where  and  denote, respectively, the fraction of household members
who are employed and unemployed (and looking for a job).10 Parameter  ∈
9Merz (1995) was the ﬁrst to adopt a the assumption of a representative "large" house-
hold with a conventional utility function in the context of a search model.
10I focus on variations in labor input at the extensive margin, and abstract from possible
variations over time in hours per worker (or eﬀort per worker). Even though the latter
10[01] represents the marginal disutility generated by an unemployed member
relative to an employed one. Non-participation in the labor market generates
no disutility to the household. Note that the labor force (or participation
rate) is given by  +  ≡ . The following constraints must be satisﬁed
for all : () ≥ 0,a l l ∈ [01], 0 ≤  +  ≤ 1,  ≥ 0 and  ≥ 0.
The household’s period utility is assumed to take the form






and where the disutility implied by labor market activities can be interpreted
as resulting from foregone leisure and/or consumption of home produced
goods. Note that by setting  =0the resulting utility function specializes
to one commonly used in monetary models of the business cycle. That
speciﬁcation is consistent with a balanced growth path and involves a direct
parametrization of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, which is given by 1.
On the other hand, if  =0is assumed, we can interpret the term +
as the sum of the disutilities of labor market activities of all household
members, with work and unemployment generating, respectively, individual
disutilities of  and  (with no disutility generated by non-participation).11
Note also that the chosen speciﬁcation diﬀers from the one generally used in
the search and matching literature, where the marginal rate of substitution
is assumed to be constant, thus implying a fully inelastic labor supply above
a certain threshold wage.
Employment evolves over time according to
 =( 1− )−1 + 0
 (4)
display non trivial cyclical movements in the data, its introduction seems unnecessary
to convey the basic points made below. See Trigari (2009) and Thomas (2008), among
others, for examples of related models that allow for variation in (disutility-generating)
hours per worker.
11See, e.g., Shimer (2009).
11where  is a constant separation rate,  is the job ﬁnding rate, and 0
 is
the fraction of household members who are unemployed (and looking for a
job) at the beginning of period ˙ .N o t et h a t =( 1− )0
 .12
The household faces a sequence of budget constraints given by
Z 1
0




where () is the price of good , () is the nominal wage paid by ﬁrm
,  represents purchases of one-period bonds (at a price ), and Π is a
lump-sum component of income (which may include, among other items, div-
idends from ownership of ﬁrms or lump-sum taxes). The above sequence of
period budget constraints is supplemented with a solvency condition which
prevents the household from engaging in Ponzi schemes.











1− denotes the price index for ﬁnal goods. Note
also that (5) implies that total consumption expenditures can be written as
R 1
0 ()()  = .









In the model with frictionless, perfectly competitive labor markets the
household would determine how much labor to supply, taking as given the
12Note that (4) implies that current hires become productive in the same period. This
is the timing assumed in Blanchard and Galí (2009) and consistent with the bulk of
the business cycle literature, where employment is assumed to be a non-predetermined
variable. In contrast, most search and matching models assume it takes one period for a
new hire to become productive, thus making employment predetermined, and preventing
it from responding contemporaneously to shocks.
12(single) market wage. The wage would adjust so that all the labor supplied
is employed, implying the absence of involuntary unemployment. Thus,
we would have  =  for all , and under the assumed preferences, an
intratemporal optimality condition would hold, equating the real wage to
the marginal rate of substitution,  = 

 , and implicitly deter-
mining the quantity of labor supplied. The present model departs from that
Walrasian benchmark in an important respect: the wage does not "automat-
ically" adjust to guarantee that all the labor supplied is employed. Instead,
the wage is bargained bilaterally between individual workers and ﬁrms in
order to split the surplus generated by existing employment relations. Em-
ployment is then the result of the aggregation of ﬁrms’ hiring decisions,
given the wage protocol. In other words, employment is demand deter-
mined, with the households’ participation decision inﬂuencing employment
only indirectly, through its impact on wages and on hiring costs.
3.2 Firms
As in much of the literature on nominal rigidities and labor market frictions,
I assume a model with a two-sector structure. Firms in the ﬁnal goods sector
do not use labor as an input, but are subject to nominal rigidities in the
form of restrictions to the frequency of their price-setting decisions. On
the other hand, ﬁrms in the intermediate goods sector take the price of
the good they produce as given, use labor as an input (subject to hiring
costs), and engage in wage bargaining with its workers. That modelling
strategy, originally proposed in Walsh (2005), has the advantage of getting
around the diﬃculties associated with having price setting decisions and
13wage bargaining concentrated in the same ﬁrms.13
3.2.1 Final Goods
I assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms indexed by  ∈
[01], each producing a diﬀerentiated ﬁnal good. All ﬁrms have access to an
identical technology
()=()
where () is the quantity of the (single) intermediate good used by ﬁrm 
as an input.
Under ﬂexible prices each ﬁrm would set the price of its good optimally
each period, subject to a demand schedule with constant price elasticity .14




 is the price of the intermediate good, M ≡ 
−1 is the optimal or
desired (gross) markup and  is a subsidy on the purchases of intermediate
goods. Note that (1 − )
 is the nominal marginal cost facing the ﬁnal
goods ﬁrm. Since all ﬁrms choose the same price it follows that
 = M(1 − )

for all .
Instead of ﬂexible prices, I assume in much of what follows a price-setting
environment as in Calvo (1983), with each ﬁrm being able to adjust its price
each period only with probability 1 − . That probability is independent
13See Kuester (2007) and Thomas (2008b) for an analysis of a version of the model
where price setters are subject to labor market frictions.
14As discussed below, this requires that the demand of ﬁn a lg o o d sc o m i n gf r o mi n t e r -
mediate goods ﬁrms (in order to pay for their hiring costs), has the same price elasticity
as the demand originating in households.
14across ﬁrms and independent of the time elapsed since the last price adjust-
ment. Thus, parameter  ∈ [01] also represents the fraction of ﬁrms that
keep their prices unchanged in any given period and can thus be interpreted
as an index of price rigidities.
All ﬁrms adjusting their price in any given period choose the same price,
denoted by ∗
 , since they face an identical problem. The (log-linearized)
optimal price setting condition in this environment is given by15
∗




+} − ) (7)
where lower case letters denote the logs of the original variables,  ≡
logM.T h u s , ﬁrms that adjust their price in any given period, choose
a (log) price that is equal to the desired (log) markup over a weighted aver-
age of current and (expected) future (log) marginal costs, with the weights
being a function of both the discount factor  and the Calvo parameter .
By combining (7) with the (log-linearized) law of motion for the aggre-
gate price level given by16
 = −1 +( 1− )∗
 (8)














 −  =  − (
 − ) − 
denotes the deviation of the (log) average price markup from its desired (and
steady state) value, and  ≡
(1−)(1−)
 . Equation (9) makes clear that
15See, e.g. Galí (2008, chapter 3), for details of the derivation.
16Equation (8) can be derived by log-linearizing the expression for the aggregate price
level  a r o u n daz e r oi n ﬂation steady state, and using the fact that a fraction 1 −  of
ﬁr m ss e tt h es a m ep r i c e
∗
 , while the price index for the remaining fraction that keep
their price unchanged is −1, since they are drawn randomly from the universe of ﬁrms.
15whatever is the inﬂuence of labor market frictions and wage-setting practices
on the dynamics of price inﬂation it must necessarily work through their
impact on ﬁrms’ markups, since variations in price inﬂation are the result
of misalignments between current and desired price markups.
3.2.2 Intermediate Goods
The intermediate good is produced by a continuum of identical, perfectly
competitive ﬁrms, represented by the unit interval and indexed by  ∈ [01].
All such ﬁrms have access to a production function
 
 ()=()1−
Variable  represents the state of technology, which is assumed to be com-
mon across ﬁrms and to vary exogenously over time. More precisely, I
assume that  ≡ log follows an (1) process with autoregressive coef-
ﬁcient  and variance 2
.
Employment at ﬁrm  evolves according to
()=( 1− )−1()+() (10)
where  ∈ (01) is an exogenous separation rate, and () represents the
measure of workers hired by ﬁrm  in period . N o t et h a tn e wh i r e ss t a r t
working in the period they are hired. That timing assumption, which follows
Blanchard and Galí (2009), deviates from the standard one in the search
and matching literature (which requires a one period lag before a hired
worker becomes productive), but is consistent with conventional business
cycle models, where employment is not a predetermined variable.
Labor Market Frictions. Following Blanchard and Galí (2009), I
introduce labor market frictions in the form of a cost per hire, represented
16by  and deﬁned in terms of the bundle of ﬁnal goods. That cost is assumed
to be exogenous to each individual ﬁrm.
Though  is taken as given by each individual ﬁrm, it is natural to think
of it as depending on aggregate factors. One natural such determinant is
t h ed e g r e eo ft i g h t n e s si nt h el a b o rm a r k e t ,w h i c hc a nb ea p p r o x i m a t e db y
the job ﬁnding rate  ≡ 0
 , i.e. the ratio of aggregate hires,  ≡
R 1
0 (), to the size of the unemployment pool at the beginning of the
period, 0





Relation to the matching function approach. The above formulation is
equivalent to the matching function approach adopted by the search liter-
ature. Under the latter, ﬁrms and workers match according to a function
(0
 ) where  represents the number of aggregate vacancies, and where
a ﬁrm can post vacancies at a unit cost Γ. Under the assumption of homo-
geneity of degree one in the matching function, the fraction of posted vacan-
cies that get ﬁlled within the period is given by (0
 ) ≡ (0
 ),




 ) where 0  0. It follows that a fraction (−1())
of vacancies posted are ﬁlled with the resulting cost per hire being given by
 = Γ(−1()), which is increasing in . In particular, under the as-
sumption of a Cobb-Douglas matching function (0
 )= 
 01− we
17Instead, Blanchard and Galí (2009) assume a hiring cost of the form Γ

 . Though
at the possible cost of less realism, that formulation has the advantage of preserving the
homogeneity of the eﬃciency conditions with respect to the technology shock  , leading
to an constrained-eﬃcient allocations with a constant employment, which is a convenient
benchmark.
17have  = Γ 
1−

 , which coincides with the above speciﬁcation of the cost
function, for  ≡ 1−
 .
I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fl a b o rm a r k e tf r i c t i ons, wages (and, as a result, employ-
ment) may diﬀer across ﬁrms, since they cannot be automatically arbitraged
out by workers switching from low to high wage ﬁrms. I make this explicit
by using the subindex  to refer to the wage and other variables that are
potentially ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Given a wage (), the optimal hiring policy of




+  − (1 − )  {Λ+1 +1} (11)
where () ≡ (
 )( 1 −)()− is the marginal revenue prod-
uct of labor (expressed in terms of ﬁnal goods) and Λ+ ≡ (+) is
the stochastic discount factor for -period ahead (real) payoﬀs.18 In words,
each period the ﬁrm hires workers up to the point where the marginal rev-
enue product of labor equals the cost of a marginal worker. The latter,
represented by the right hand side of (11), has three components: (i) the
real wage (), (ii) the hiring cost , and (iii) the discounted savings
in future hiring costs that result from having to hire (1 − ) fewer workers











i.e. the hiring cost must equate the (expected) surplus generated by the
(marginal) worker.19




19Implicitly it is assumed that the ﬁrm is always doing some positive hiring. This will
be the case if exogenous separations are large enough and shocks are small enough.
18For notational convenience it is useful to deﬁne the net hiring cost as






The previous optimality condition can be used to derive an expression
for the (log) average price markup in the ﬁnal goods sector, which was





0 () as approximate measures of (log) aggregate employment
and the (log) average nominal wage around a symmetric steady state, log-
linearization of (12) and subsequent integration over all ﬁrms yields the
following expression for the average markup in the ﬁnal goods sector:20
b 

 =(  −  b ) − [(1 − Φ) b  + Φ b ] (13)
where  ≡ − is the average (log) real wage, and Φ ≡ 
()+ measures
the importance of (non-wage) hiring costs relative to the wage. Also, note
for future reference that
b  =
1
1 − (1 − )
b  −
(1 − )
1 − (1 − )
({b +1} − b ) (14)
where b  =  b  and where  denotes the real return on a riskless one-period
bond. 21
Finally, note that (12) also implies
 (() − )=−(1 − Φ)( () − ) (15)






 have well deﬁned steady states, the
previous equation will also hold in log-levels (with an added constant term), and hence
will be consistent with non-stationary technology.
21T h ep r i c eo fao n e - p e r i o dr i s k l e s sr e a lb o n di sg i v e nb yexp{−} = {Λ+1} .
Log-linearizing around a steady state we have
  ≡  −  ' −{ +1}
where  ≡−log and +1 ≡ logΛ+1.
19i.e. the relative demand for labor by any given ﬁrm depends exclusively on its
relative wage, with the corresponding elasticity being given by −(1−Φ).
Note that this is a consequence of the hiring cost being common to all ﬁrms
and independent of each ﬁrm’s hiring and employment levels.22
3.2.3 A Brief Detour: Labor Market Frictions and Inﬂation Dy-
namics
Empirical assessments of the price setting block of the New Keynesian model
h a v eo f t e nf o c u s e do ni n ﬂation equation (9) and made use of the fact that, in
the absence of labor market frictions, the average price markup (or, equiv-
alently, the real marginal cost, with the sign reversed) is given by
b 





 ≡ b  − (b  − b ) is the (log) labor income share, expressed as a
deviation from its mean. The latter variable is readily available for most
industrialized countries and can thus be used to construct a measure of
the average markup, which can in turn serve as the basis for any empirical
evaluation of (9).23
The analysis above implies that in the presence of labor market frictions
b 

 =(  −  b ) − [(1 − Φ) b  + Φ b ]
= −b 
 − Φ (b  − b )
22The assumption of a decreasing returns technology is required in order for wage diﬀer-
entials across ﬁrm to be consistent with equilibrium, given the assumption of price taking
behavior (otherwise only the ﬁrm with the lowest wage would not be priced out of the
market). As an alternative, Thomas (2008) assumes a constant returns technology, but
combines it with the assumption of ﬁrm-speciﬁc convex vacancy posting costs, in the form
of management utility losses.
23See Galí and Gertler (1999), Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001) and Sbordone
(2002) for early applications of that approach.








 + Φ (b  − b )
´
(16)
Given (11) and the fact that b  =  b  it follows that in the presence of
labor market frictions the measure of the average markup takes the form of
a "corrected" labor income share, where the correction involves information
on the current and future job ﬁnding rate.
In a recent paper, Krause, López-Salido and Lubik (2008) revisit the
empirical evidence on inﬂation dynamics using an equation similar to (16),
together with data on the job ﬁnding rate to construct a modiﬁed markup se-
ries. They conclude that the impact of labor market frictions on the driving
variable of inﬂation is rather limited. To some extent this is something
one could anticipate for, as discussed below, under a realistic calibration
of hiring costs, 
 =( 0 045)(1 − (1 − )) ' 0006, implying too small a
coeﬃcient Φ to make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the markup measure, at least
in the absence of implausibly large ﬂuctuations in net hiring costs relative
to wages.
3.3 Monetary Policy
Under the model’s baseline speciﬁcation, monetary policy is assumed to be
d e s c r i b e db yas i m p l eT a y l o r - t y p ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l er e p r e s e n t e db y
 =  + 

 + b  +  (17)
where  ≡− log is the yield on a one-period nominally riskless bond,
 ≡−log is the household’s discount rate, and  is an exogenous policy
shifter, which is assumed to follow an (1) process with autoregressive
coeﬃcient  and variance 2
.
21Following Taylor (1993, 1999), I take a properly calibrated version of the
previous rule as a rough approximation to actual monetary policy in the U.S.
Much of the recent literature on nominal rigidities and labor market frictions
has also adopted an interest rate rule similar to (17), even though some
details may diﬀer across papers.24 Even though (17) is used as a baseline
speciﬁcation of monetary policy, I also consider alternative speciﬁcations of
the policy rule when I turn to the normative analysis in Section 6.
Next I turn to a description of wage determination.
3.4 Labor Market Frictions and Wage Determination
I consider two alternative assumptions regarding wage setting: ﬂexible wages
and sticky wages. Under ﬂexible wages, all wages are renegotiated and (po-
tentially) adjusted every period. Under sticky wages only a constant fraction
of ﬁrms can adjust their nominal wages in any given period. In both cases,
the wage is determined according to a Nash bargaining protocol, with con-
stant shares of the total surplus associated with each existing employment
relation accruing to the worker (or his household) and the ﬁrm, respectively.
In contrast with the existing monetary models with labor market fric-
tions, the framework below lies in its explicit (albeit stylized) modelling
of the participation decision. This is possible through the introduction of a
(utility) cost to labor market participation, which the household must trade-
oﬀ against the probability and beneﬁts resulting from becoming employed.25
24Thus, Walsh (2005), Faia (2008) and Trigari (2009) include the lagged nominal rate
i nt h er u l ea sas o u r c eo fi n e r t i a ,b u ti m p o s ethat the shock be serially uncorrelated. In
addition, Walsh (2005) also assumes no systematic response to output, whereas Faia (2008)
also includes unemployment as an argument of the rule. Chéron and Langot (2000) and
Walsh (2003) are an exception in that they assume an exogenous process for the money
supply, a less appealing speciﬁcation from the point of view of realism.
25My approach here generalizes the one used by Shimer (2008) in the context of a real
search and matching model.
22Next I show, for both the ﬂexible and sticky wage environments, how the
surplus is split between households and ﬁrms as a function of the wage. In
all cases, workers are assumed to act in a way consistent with maximization
of the utility of their household, as speciﬁed in (1) and (3) (as opposed to
maximization of their hypothetical "individual" utility).
3.4.1 The Case of Flexible Wages
Under this scenario each ﬁrm negotiates every period with its workers over
their individual compensation. The value accruing to the representative
household from a member employed at ﬁrm , expressed in terms of ﬁnal













where  ≡ 

 is the household’s marginal rate of substitution be-
tween consumption and labor market eﬀort (or, equivalently, the marginal
disutility of labor market eﬀort, expressed in terms of the ﬁnal goods bun-
dle), and V
 is the value generated by a member who is unemployed at the















The value associated with non-participation is normalized to zero. Under
the assumption of an interior allocation with positive non-participation, the
household must be indiﬀerent between sending an additional member to the
labor market or not. Thus, it must be the case that V
 =0for all .T h e
26Note that in deﬁning below the surplus relative to the value of an unemployed person
at the begining of theperiod I am implicitly assuming that if no wage agreement is reached
the worker always has a chance to join the pool of the unemployed and look for a job in
the same period.











 () ≡ V
 ()−V
 ()=V
 () denotes the surplus accruing to the












On the other hand, the surplus from an existing employment relation











Note that under the maintained assumption that the ﬁrm is maximizing
proﬁts, it follows from (11) and (20) that S
 ()= for all  ∈ [01]
and . In words, the surplus that a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm gets from an
existing employment relation equals the hiring cost (which is also the cost
of replacing a current worker by a new one, and thus what a ﬁrm "saves"
from maintaining an existing relation).
The reservation wage for a worker employed at ﬁrm  is the minimum
wage consistent with a non-negative surplus. It is given by
Ω





The corresponding reservation wage for the ﬁrm, i.e. the wage consistent
with a non-negative surplus for the ﬁrm is:
Ω





27Note that under the assumption that  =0 ,t h e r ew o u l db en oc o s ta s s o c i a t e dw i t h
remaining unemployed so, to the extent the surplus from employment S

 () was positive,
there would be full participation, so that  =1−  for all .
24The bargaining set at ﬁrm  in period  is deﬁned by the range of
wage levels consistent with a non-negative surplus for both the ﬁrm and






.N o t et h a t
the size of the bargaining set is given by
Ω





In other words, the presence of labor market frictions in the form of hiring
costs guarantees the existence, in equilibrium, of a non-trivial bargaining set
and, as a consequence, room for bargaining between ﬁrms and workers. As
emphasized by Hall (2005) any wage that lies within the bargaining set
is consistent with a privately eﬃcient employment relation, i.e. one that
neither the worker nor the ﬁrm has an incentive to terminate.
Until the work of Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005), the search and match-
ing literature has generally relied on the assumption of period-by-period Nash
bargaining between workers and ﬁrms as a "selection rule" to determine the
prevailing wage. This has also been the case for the more recent vintage
of models with sticky prices, when no wage rigidities are assumed (see, e.g.
Walsh (2003, 2005) and Trigari (2005)). In what follows, I take the assump-
tion of period-by-period Nash bargaining as the one deﬁning the ﬂexible
wage economy, leaving a discussion of alternative for the next subsection.
Period-by-period Nash bargaining implies that the ﬁrm and each of its






subject to (19) and (20), and where  ∈ (01) denotes the relative bargaining
power of ﬁrms vis a vis workers.
25The solution to that problem implies the following constant share rule:
 S
 ()=( 1− ) S
 ()




 ()+( 1− ) Ω
 ()
=     +( 1− ) () (21)
Using (12) to substitute for () we conﬁrm that the wage is
common to all ﬁrms and, as a result, so will be employment, the hiring
rate, and the marginal revenue product. Thus, we can henceforth omit the
 index in what follows and write the Nash wage as


=     +( 1− )  (22)
which combined with (11) (evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium) implies
 − (1 − )  {Λ+1 +1} =  ( − ) (23)
Finally, note that under Nash bargaining the participation condition (18)
can be rewritten as28




3.4.2 The Case of Sticky Wages
The ﬂexibility of wages implied by the assumption of period-by-period Nash
bargaining made in the previous subsection stands in conﬂict with the em-
pirical evidence. More speciﬁcally, equation (22) implies that the nominal
wage of all workers should experience continuous adjustments in response
28As before, (24) is only needed when 0,s ot h a t 6= .
26to changes in the price level, consumption, employment, productivity and
any other variable that may aﬀect the marginal rate of substitution or the
marginal revenue product of ﬁrms. By contrast, the evidence based on ob-
servation of individual wages point to substantial nominal wage rigidities.
Thus, Taylor’s (1999) survey of the evidence concludes that the average fre-
quency of wage changes is about one year. Evidence of similar (and even
stronger) nominal wage rigidities can be found in more recent studies using
U.S. micro data (e.g. Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk (2009)) as well as
micro data and surveys from many European countries (European Central
Bank (2009).
Motivated by that evidence, and by the diﬃculties of calibrated search
and matching models with ﬂexible wages to account for the observed volatil-
ity of unemployment or the "excess smoothness" of the real wage relative
to labor productivity and GDP, many researchers have introduced diﬀerent
forms of wage rigidities in models with labor market frictions. As argued
by Hall (2005), those frictions "make room" for such rigid wages, since they
imply a non-trivial wage bargaining set consistent with privately eﬃcient
employment relations. In Hall’s words, that property "...provides a full an-
swer to the condemnation of sticky wage models in Robert Barro (1977), for
invoking an ineﬃciency that intelligent actors could easily avoid."
Perhaps not surprisingly given the indeterminacy inherent to the exis-
tence of a bargaining set, the range of proposals to model wage rigidities in
the literature is broad. Thus, some authors introduce real wage rigidities (in
either real or monetary models) by postulating an "ad-hoc" real wage sched-
ule which implies (potentially) continuous adjustment of all wages, though
one that is smoother than that implied by period-by-period Nash bargaining
(see, e.g. Hall (2005), Blanchard and Galí (2007, 2010), and Christoﬀel and
27Linzert (2005)). An alternative approach to modelling wage rigidities as-
sumes staggered wage setting, so that only a fraction of workers are allowed
to bargain over and adjust their wage in any given period. In that case, each
individual wage remains unchanged for several periods, either in real terms
(Gertler and Trigari (2009)) or, more realistically, in nominal terms (as in
Bodart et al. (2006), Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) and Thomas (2008)).
Here I follow the last group of authors and introduce wage rigidities in
the form of staggered nominal wage setting à la Calvo. More speciﬁcally, I
assume that the nominal wages paid by a given ﬁrm to its employees are
renegotiated (and likely reset) with probability 1− each period, indepen-
dently of the time elapsed since the last adjustment at that ﬁrm. The newly
set wage is determined through Nash bargaining between each individual
worker and the ﬁrm. Once the nominal wage is set, it remains unchanged
until a new opportunity for resetting the wage arises. As a result, in any
given period the wage (both real and nominal) will generally deviate from
the ﬂexible Nash wage derived in the previous subsection. Yet, and to the
extent that shocks are not too large, the wage will remain within the rel-
evant bargaining set and will thus be privately eﬃcient to maintain the
corresponding employment relation.
Most importantly, I assume that workers hired between renegotiation
periods are paid the average wage prevailing at the ﬁrm. Thus, the average
wage will have an inﬂuence on the ﬁrm’s hiring and employment levels. Yet,
I assume that the number of workers is large enough that neither the ﬁrm
nor the worker bargaining over the wage internalize the impact that their
choice will have on the average wage. In a symmetric equilibrium all workers
will get the same wage, which ex-post will be equal to the average.29 It is
29This assumption simpliﬁes the subsequent analysis considerably.
28important to stress that the previous assumption is not an innocuous one.
If new hires could negotiate their wage freely at the time of being hired,
the existence of long spells with unchanged nominal wages for incumbent
workers would have no direct impact on the hiring decisions and, as a result,
on output and employment, as emphasized by and Pissarides (2009). The
empirical evidence on the relevance of wage stickiness for new hires remains
controversial. Some authors have provided evidence pointing to greater wage
ﬂexibility for new hires (see. e.g. Haefke et al. (2008), and the references
in Pissarides (2009)), while others reject the existence of any signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between new hires and incumbent workers (e.g. Gertler and
Trigari (2009) and Galuscak et al. (2008)).30
An immediate consequence of the staggering assumption is that wages
will generally diﬀer across ﬁrms, and so will employment and output. That
dispersion in the allocation of workers across otherwise identical ﬁrms, cou-
pled with the assumption of decreasing returns, is ineﬃcient from a social
viewpoint, a point further discussed below in the context of the normative
analysis of the model.31
Next I derive the basic equations describing the surpluses accruing to
households and ﬁrms from existing employment relations, as a preliminary
step to the analysis of wage determination as the outcome of a Nash bargain.
Let V
+| denote the value accruing to a household in period + from
t h ee m p l o y m e n to fam e m b e ra taﬁrm that last reset its wage in period .
30See Section 6 for a brief discussion of an extension by Brodart et al. (2007) allowing
for diﬀerential ﬂexibility between incumbents and new hires.
31The ineﬃciencies resulting from staggered nominal wage setting were already stressed
in Erceg et al. (2000), in the context of a model without labor market frictions. Wage
staggering in Thomas (2008) leads to an aggregate ineﬃciency as a result of the convexity
of vacancy posting costs at the level of each ﬁrm. Here the ineﬃciency results from the
presence of decreasing returns to labor.
















for  =0 123 where ∗
 denotes the nominal wage newly set in period
.32 Note that the last term on the right hand side of (25) reﬂects the fact
that the continuation value depends on whether wages are readjusted or not
in the following period.
On the other hand, the value accruing to a household in period  from
a member who is unemployed (but part of the labor force) at the beginning










 () +( 1− )
¡
− + {Λ+1 
+1}
¢
Again, optimal participation implies V
























 ()  (27)
Iterating (26) forward and evaluating the resulting expression at  =0
one can determine the household surplus from an employment relation at a





















32Note that even though newly set wages can in principle diﬀer across workers and ﬁrms,
ex-post all individual wages set in any given period will be identical. That justiﬁes the
omission of ﬁrm or worker indexes in 
∗

30On the other hand, the period  + surplus accruing to a ﬁrm that last
renegotiated its wages in period , resulting from a marginal employment

















+| is the ﬁrm’s
marginal revenue product of labor, and +| its employment level.
Note, for future reference, that when combined with the optimal choice




for all  and . In words, the surplus accruing to the ﬁrm is always equal to
the current hiring cost, independently of how long the wage has remained
unchanged.






















In the present environment, the Nash bargained wage at a ﬁrm that







subject to (28) and (30). The implied sharing rule is given by
 S
| =( 1− ) S
| (31)
31which combined with (28) and (30) requires that the nominal wage newly
















+| ≡    + +( 1− ) +| (33)
can be interpreted as the -period ahead target real wage. Note that the
expression for the latter corresponds to that of the relevant Nash wage under
ﬂexible wages, as derived in the previous subsection (see equation (21)).
Log-linearizing the wage setting rule (32) around a zero inﬂation steady
state we obtain:
∗
 =( 1− (1 − )) 
∞ X
=0
((1 − )) {
+| + +} (34)
where 
+| ≡ logΩ
+|. In words, the nominal wage set through Nash
bargaining corresponds to a weighted average of the current and expected
future target nominal wages relevant to the ﬁrm that is resetting wages. The
weights decline geometrically with the horizon, at a rate which is a function
of the degree of wage stickiness and the separation rate, since both those
factors determine the expected duration of the newly set wage.
Next I rewrite the above expression in terms of average target wages.
Log-linearizing (33) around a symmetric steady state we have
b 
+| = Υ (b + + b +)+( 1− Υ)( −b 

+ + + −  b +|) (35)
where Υ ≡

 .L e t
 denote the (log) average target wage, deﬁned as
the current target wage for a (hypothetical) ﬁr mw h o s ee m p l o y m e n tm a t c h e d
average employment. Formally,
b 
 ≡ Υ (b  + b )+( 1− Υ)( −b 

 +  −  b ) (36)
32Note that one can interpret b 
 as the Nash bargained wage that would
be observed in a ﬂexible wage environment, conditional on the levels of con-
sumption and (average) marginal revenue product generated by the equilib-
rium allocation under sticky wages.
Combining (35) and (36) with (15)
b 
+| = b 
+ +( 1− Υ)(1 − Φ)( ∗
 − +) (37)
Substituting (37) into (34), and after some algebraic manipulation we
can derive the diﬀerence equation
∗
 = (1−) {∗
+1}−
1 − (1 − )




The law of motion for the (log) average wage  ≡
R 1
0 () is given
by
 = −1 +( 1− )∗
 (39)
Combining (38) and (39), one can derive the following wage inﬂation
equation:

 = (1 − ){




 (1−(1−Υ)(1−Φ)) . Note that the driving variable behind ﬂuc-
tuations in wage inﬂation is t h ew a g eg a p−
 ,d e ﬁned as the deviation
between the average wage and the average target wage.33
Finally, and as shown in Appendix 4, the optimal participation condition
(27) can be approximated around the zero inﬂation steady state as follows:
b  + b  =
1
1 − 
b  + b  − Ξ
 (41)
33Thomas (2008) derives a similar representation for wage inﬂation, in the context of






(1−)(1−(1−)). Note that under ﬂexible wages  =0 ,
implying Ξ =0 . The left hand side of (41) measures the cost of labor market
participation (through joining the pool of unemployed at the beginning of the
period), while the right hand is the expected reward from that participation,
both expressed as log deviations from their steady state values. That reward
is increasing in the job ﬁnding rate and in the size of current hiring costs
(since workers with newly set wages will generate a surplus proportional to
that variable), and decreasing in wage inﬂation (since the latter is positively
related to the gap between the newly set wage and the average wage, with
the latter being the one that is relevant to the participation decision).
Sustainability of the ﬁxed wage.B o t ht h eﬁrm and the worker will ﬁnd
it eﬃcient to maintain an existing employment relation as long as their
respective surpluses are positive. Thus, for a worker and ﬁrm that last reset
t h ew a g ei np e r i o d, this will be the case as long as the nominal wage ∗

remains within the bargaining set bounded by the reservation wages of the







+ − (1 − )+
n
Λ+++1(S






+| +( 1− ) + {Λ+++1 ++1}
¢
Note that in the zero inﬂa t i o ns t e a d ys t a t ew eh a v e∗ =  ( +(1−
)), so that the newly set wage lies within the bargaining set. Thus, the
34probability that the wage of any ﬁrm remains within that set outside the
steady state will be larger the more stable are prices and consumption, em-
ployment, unemployment and technology (the variables underlying 
and +| ). This will be the case, in turn, if shocks are "suﬃciently
small," an assumption that I maintain in what follows. Notice, however, that
given the Calvo structure, which implies that there are some wages that re-
mained unchanged for arbitrarily long periods, it will be unavoidable that
a small fraction of ﬁrms violate that condition in ﬁnite time (which would
call for terminating the relationship or, more plausibly, violating the ex-
ogenous Calvo constraint on the timing of wage adjustments). Gertler and
Trigari (2009) and Thomas (2009) conduct simulations of related models
and conclude that, for plausible calibrations of the wage rigidity parameter
and shocks of empirically plausible size, the typical wage has a very small
probability of falling outside the bar g a i n i n gs e tb e f o r ei tg e t st ob er e a d -
justed. On those grounds, and following the literature, in my analysis I
ignore that possibility, thus assuming that no wage ever hits the boundaries
of the bargaining set.34
3.4.3 Relation to the New Keynesian Wage Inﬂation Equation.
Equation (40) has a structure analogous to the wage inﬂation equation that
arises in the New Keynesian model with staggered nominal wage setting,
as originally developed by Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000; EHL, hence-
forth). In the latter, each household is specialized in supplying a diﬀer-
entiated type of labor service, whose demand has a constant elasticity .
In any given period it is allowed to reset the corresponding nominal wage
34See Galí and van Rens (2009) for a model in which wages are adjusted only when they
hit the boundaries of the bargaining set.
35unilaterally with a constant probability 1−. The implied (log-linearized)
optimal wage setting rule in the EHL model takes the form
∗
 =  +( 1− ) 
∞ X
=0
(){+| + +} (42)
where  ≡ log 
−1 is the desired (log) wage markup of the real wage over
the marginal rate of substitution (i.e. the one prevailing in the absence of
wage rigidities). The previous optimal wage setting rule can be contrasted
with (34), the one prevailing under staggered wage setting with Nash bar-
gaining.
The wage inﬂation equation that results from combining the log-linearized
optimal wage setting rule (42) with a law of motion for the average wage
identical to (39) can be written as

 = {
+1} − (b  − d ) (43)
where  is the average (log) marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and hours, and  is a coeﬃcient that is inversely related to the
degree of wage stickiness . In particular, under the speciﬁcation of pref-
erences used in the model above with  =0 ,w eh a v ed  = b  + b  and
 ≡ (1 − )(1 − )((1 + )).35
Three main diﬀerences with respect to (40)) are worth pointing out.
First, the "eﬀective" discount factor is smaller in the model with frictions,
since it incorporates the probability of termination of each relationship (and
thus of the associated wage), whereas in the EHL model the wage applies to
the same group of workers throughout its duration, not to a speciﬁcr e l a t i o n
that may be subject to termination. Secondly, the implicit target wage in the
35See Galí (2009) for a discussion of the relation between the New Keynesian Wage
inﬂation equation and the original Phillips curve.
36EHL model is given by the average marginal rate of substitution (augmented
with a constant desired wage markup), whereas in the model with frictions
the target wage is also a function of the marginal revenue product of labor,
since that variable also inﬂuences the total surplus to be split through the
wage negotiation. Finally, the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcient on the wage gap
between the two formulations captures the diﬀerent adjustments needed to
express the wage inﬂation equation in terms of average variables: the average
marginal rate of substitution in the EHL model, and the average marginal
revenue product of labor in the present model. Note that under the special
parameter conﬁguration  =0and  =1 , the form of the wage inﬂation
equation of the present model matches exactly that of the EHL model.
3.5 Aggregate Demand and Output
Under the assumption that hiring costs take the form of a bundle of ﬁ-
nal goods given by the same CES function as the one deﬁning the con-





( + ),w h e r e ≡
R 1
0 ()  denotes aggregate hires.
Thus, the implied constancy of the price elasticity of demand justifying the
constant desired markup M ≡ 
−1 assumed above.





−1 it can be
easily checked that the aggregate goods market clearing condition may be
written as
 =  +  (44)
Hence, aggregate demand has two components. The ﬁrst component
is consumption, which evolves according to the Euler equation (6). The
second component is the demand for ﬁnal goods originating in ﬁrms’ hiring
activities.
37Turning to the supply side, one can derive the following aggregate rela-






















 ≥ 1 captures the ineﬃciency resulting
from dispersion in the quantities produced and consumed of the diﬀerent
ﬁnal goods, which is itself a consequence of the price dispersion caused by
staggered price setting.























 ≥ 1 captures the ineﬃciency
resulting from dispersion in the allocation of labor across ﬁrms due to the
staggering of wages, combined with the assumption of decreasing returns
(0).
As shown in Appendix 1, in a neighborhood of the zero inﬂation steady
state we have 

 ' 1 and 
 ' 1 up to a ﬁrst order approximation. Thus,




For the sake of convenience, Appendix 3 collects all the model’s (log)
linearized equilibrium conditions, as derived in the previous sections. Next
38I use those equilibrium conditions to characterize the behavior of a calibrated
v e r s i o no fm ym o d e le c o n o m y .
4 Equilibrium Dynamics: The Eﬀects of Mone-
tary Policy and Technology Shocks
This section presents the equilibrium responses of several variables of inter-
est to the model’s exogenous shocks—monetary policy and technology—and
discusses how those responses are aﬀected by nominal rigidities and labor
market frictions. As a preliminary step I discuss the model’s steady state,
which is partly the basis for the calibration.
4.1 Steady State and Calibration
The model’s steady state is independent of the degree of price and wage
rigidities, and of the monetary policy rule. For simplicity, I assume a steady
state with zero inﬂation and no secular growth. I normalize the level of
technology in the steady state to be  =1 . Notice that in that steady state
there are no relative price distortions so  =  =1Thus, the goods
market clearing condition, evaluated at the steady state, can be written as
1− =  +  Γ (48)
Evaluating (23) at the steady state we have







Finally, the steady state participation condition requires
(1 − ) =( 1− ) Γ1+ (50)
The remaining steady state conditions include:
 =( 1− ) (51)
39 =  +  (52)
In order to calibrate the model I adopt the following strategy. First, I pin
down the steady state employment rate, participation rate and job ﬁnding
rate using observed average values in the postwar U.S. economy. This leads
t ot h ec h o i c eo f =0 59 and  =0 62, which in turn imply  =0 03 .
Note that the implied unemployment rate as a fraction of the labor force—
the conventional deﬁnition—is then close to ﬁve percent. (003062 ' 0048).
Following Blanchard and Galí (2010), I set the steady state value for the
(quarterly) job ﬁnding rate  to 07. The implied separation rate is thus
 =( 1 − ) ' 012. Following convention I set  =1 3 and  =
099. Parameter  is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, a
more controversial parameter due to the conﬂict between micro and macro
evidence. I set  =5in the baseline calibration, which corresponds to a
Frisch elasticity of 02.
The baseline values for the parameters determining the degree of price
and wage stickiness are set to imply average durations of one year in both
cases, i.e.  =0 75 and  =0 75. This is roughly consistent with micro-
economic evidence on wage and price setting.36
Using the equivalence with the matching function approach discussed
above and using estimates of the latter I set  =1 . I also assume M(1−)=
1, so that the subsidy fully oﬀsets the distortionary eﬀects of ﬁnalgoodsﬁrms
market power, one of the conditions for an eﬃcient steady state. Following
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Shimer (2009), who rely on the evidence
reported in Silva and Toledo (2009), I take the average cost of hiring a worker
to be 45% of the quarterly wage, i.e.  =0 045 (). Accordingly, the
36See, e.g. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Basu and Gottschalk (2009) for recent
U.S. micro evidence on price and wage rigidities, respectively.
40share of hiring costs in GDP is Θ =  =( 0 045),w h e r e is
the labor income share. Setting the latter to 23 we have Θ =0 0014,
i.e. slightly above one-tenth of a percentage point of GDP. It follows that
Γ =  = Θ()=0 02 .
This leaves me with three free (though related) parameters, the ﬁrm’s
share in the Nash bargain (), the weight of unemployment in the the disu-
tility of labor market eﬀort (), and the parameter scaling that disutility
(). Given the value for one of these parameters, I can determine the re-
maining two by combining (48), (50) and (49). Given the choice of  =1
above, perhaps a natural benchmark setting for  is 05, which—as shown
below—would be the value consistent with an eﬃcient steady state and is
often assumed in the literature. Yet, that conﬁguration implies  =0 041,a
weight on unemployment which is arguably unrealistically small if one takes
into consideration not only the time allocated to job search activities by
the unemployed, but also the psychological costs of unemployment.37 Thus,
and as an alternative parameter conﬁguration I choose  =0 05,w h i c hi s
associated with  =0 82, possibly a more plausible value. As discussed
b e l o w ,t h ec h o i c eo fav a l u ei nt h a tr a n g eh a ss i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent, and
more plausible, implications for the economy’s response to a monetary pol-
icy shock. The implied settings for  corresponding to the two calibrations
are 155 and 123, respectively.
37Thus, if the disutility of the unemployed (relative to the nonparticipant) results exclu-
sively from the time allocated to job search activities and we take the standard workweek
for the employed to be of 40 hours, that calibration would that the unemployed 16 hours a
week are allocated to job search activities. This is somewhat below the 25 hours per week
of job search observed in time use surveys, as discussed in Krueger and Mueller (2008).
The latter paper also provides survey-based evidence of subjective well-being, showing
that unemployed individuals in the U.S. report considerably lower life satisfaction than
than the employed. Under literal interpretation of the model that evidence would call for
a  value above unity.
41Finally, I calibrate the coeﬃcients in the interest rate rule in a way
consistent with the speciﬁcation in Taylor (1993), i.e. I set  =1 5 and
 =0 54=0 0125 (the latter adjustment being justiﬁed by Taylor’s use
of annualized inﬂation rate vs. quarter-to-quarter inﬂation here). That cal-
ibration is generally viewed a reasonable approximation to monetary policy
in U.S., at least over the past three decades.
4.2 The Eﬀects of Monetary Policy and Technology Shocks
Figure 2a displays the dynamic responses of six macro variables (output,
unemployment, employment, labor force, inﬂation and the real wage) to an
exogenous monetary policy shock, under the baseline assumption of  =0 5,
w h i c hi sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ha ne ﬃcient steady state. More speciﬁcally, dis-
turbance  i nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l ei sa s s u m e dt or i s eb y025 percentage
points, and to die out gradually according to an AR(1) process with an au-
toregressive coeﬃcient  =0 5. Note that, in the absence of an endogenous
component in the rule, such an experiment would be associated with a one
percentage point increase in the (annualized) interest rate,
Though the estimated VAR model discussed in section 2 did not specif-
ically seek to identify monetary shocks, to the extent that those shocks and
other demand shocks generate similar patterns among the variables consid-
ered, we can use the estimated conditional moments associated with demand
shocks as a rough benchmark when evaluating the model’s response to a
monetary policy shock.
Figure 2a shows that both output and employment decline in response
to the tightening of monetary policy, due to the contraction in consumption
(not shown) resulting from the interest rate hike. Note also that the labor
force increases by nearly 5 percent, driving up the unemployment rate by
42about 5 percentage points. In light of the evidence presented in section 2,
both responses seem implausibly large and, in the case of the labor force,
i ta p p e a r st og oi nt h ew r o n gd i r e c t i o n . N o t ea l s ot h a tp r i c ei n ﬂation is
procyclical, in a way consistent with the evidence. The procyclical response
of the real wage is, on the other hand, at odds with the estimated negative
correlation with output conditional on demand shocks.
Figure 2b displays the corresponding responses to a technology shock.
The latter takes the form of a one percent increase in , which dies out
g r a d u a l l ya c c o r d i n gt oa nA R ( 1 )p r o c e s sw i t ha na u t o r e g r e s s i v ec o e ﬃcient
of 09. Note that, in a way consistent with the estimated impulse responses
shown in Figure 1, output rises and inﬂation declines, as one would expect
from a positive technology shock. Note also that the real wage rises grad-
ually in the short run, a natural consequence of the existence of nominal
wage rigidities. Furthermore, and in contrast with the standard search and
matching model, employment declines and unemployment increases in re-
sponse to the same positive technology shock. This is consistent with the
evidence presented in Section 2 and in the literature referred therein. As
was the case with monetary shocks, however, the rise in unemployment is
largely driven by the increase in the labor force, which is far more volatile
than employment and comoves negatively with the latter variable. This is
in contrast with an estimated correlation (conditional on demand shocks)
between the labor force and employment of 085.
A possible reason for the unrealistically large ﬂuctuations in the labor
force and unemployment shown in Figures 2a and 2b is the low value of
parameter  (about 004) associated with the calibration underlying those
ﬁgures. Such a low value penalizes little ﬂuctuations in those variables,
given employment. Figures 3a and 3b show the model’s implied responses
43to monetary and technology shocks under the alternative calibration, with
 =0 82 and  =0 05.A s t h e ﬁgures make clear, now the labor force
experiences much smaller variations, and comoves positively with employ-
ment. The latter’s movements are the dominant force behind the variations
in unemployment, in a way consistent with the evidence. The response of
the remaining variables is not qualitatively aﬀected. Thus, the only variable
whose response is at odds with the evidence in section 2 is the real wage,
which responds procyclically to a monetary shock in the model, while dis-
playing a negative correlation with output conditional on "demand" shocks
in the data. That discrepancy could be due, however, to the presence of
shocks other than technology shocks or monetary shocks (e.g. ﬁscal policy
or labor supply shocks) that may be responsible for the negative correla-
tion picked up by the partially identiﬁed VAR discussed in section 2. Given
the previous ﬁndings, and unless otherwise noted, I stick to this alternative
calibration in the remainder of the paper.
4.3 The Role of Labor Market Frictions
In order to ascertain the role played by the presence of labor market frictions
in shaping the economy’s response to diﬀerent shocks, I compare the model’s
implied responses to those shocks in the presence or not of such frictions. A
perfectly competitive labor market is assumed in the case of no frictions. In
both cases I maintain the assumption of ﬂexible wages, i.e. period-by-period
Nash bargaining.
Figures 4a and 4b display the economy’s response to a monetary policy
and a technology shock, respectively. Note that, in most cases the diﬀerence
is quantitatively very small. Qualitatively, the only signiﬁcant diﬀerence
lies in the non-zero unemployment response to either shock in the presence
44of frictions, whereas in their absence a perfectly competitive labor market
guarantees that there is no unemployment, implying that its response to
shocks is ﬂat at zero, as shown in the ﬁgure. The variations in unemployment
generated by the introduction of frictions are, however, very small for both
shocks. This result is reminiscent of the so-called Shimer puzzle, i.e. the
ﬁnding of too small a volatility of unemployment implied by a calibrated
(real) search and matching framework with ﬂexible wages and driven by
technology shocks (Shimer (2005)).
The ﬁnding of a small role of labor market frictions in the response
to monetary policy shocks contrasts somewhat with the conclusions from
a related analysis in Walsh (2005). More precisely, Walsh shows that the
introduction of labor market frictions has consequences on the pattern of
the response of output and inﬂation to a monetary policy shock roughly
equivalent to a substantial increase in the degree of price rigidities38 in an
otherwise standard New Keynesian model with Walrasian labor markets. In
practice, it leads to a signiﬁcantly more sluggish response of inﬂation and a
larger and more persistent response of output. A possible explanation for
the discrepancy between Walsh’s results and those found here lies in the
fact that his model with labor market frictions assumes a constant marginal
disutility from work, whereas his New Keynesian model introduces (with no
apparent justiﬁcation) a diﬀerent utility function with an increasing mar-
ginal disutility of work. The latter feature will generally make wages and
hence marginal costs more sensitive to variations in activity, thus leading to
a larger response of prices in the short run, and a more dampened output
response.39
38Corresponding to a increase in the Calvo parameter  from 05 to 085,w h i c hi s
equivalent to raising the average duration of prices from two to more than six quarters.
39A similar discrepancy arises vis a vis Trigari (2009) in her comparison of the responses
454.4 The Role of Price Stickiness
How does the introduction of sticky prices aﬀect, qualitatively and quan-
titatively, the response of unemployment and other variables to aggregate
shocks? In order to address this question I analyze the response to mone-
tary and technology shocks of two versions of the model economy developed
above, with the only diﬀerence among them is the presence or not of stag-
g e r e dp r i c es e t t i n gi nt h eﬁnal goods sector. In both cases I maintain the
assumption of full wage ﬂexibility.
Figures 5a and 5b display the corresponding impulse response functions.
First, and not surprisingly, we see that the introduction of price stickiness
has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy’s response to a monetary policy
shock (Figure 5a). Thus, under ﬂexible prices no real variable is aﬀected
by the shock, and only inﬂation declines in response to the tightening of
policy. In contrast, once a realistic degree of price stickiness is allowed for,
the model implies a decline in output, employment and the labor force, with
a rise in the unemployment rate (after a tiny one period decline). Inﬂation
and the real wage also decline, as expected.
The impact of price stickiness on the response to a positive technology
shock (Figure 5b) appears to be much more limited. In particular, the
eﬀect on the size of the output response—more muted under sticky prices—
is hardly discernible. The diﬀerence is suﬃcient, however, to account for
a sign reversal in the response of employment, from positive to negative,
though quantitatively the size of the employment adjustment is very small
of a search model and a New Keynesian model to a monetary policy shock. Thus, in
Trigari’s search model labor adjustment takes place along two margins, hours per worker
and employment, whereas in her New Keynesian model only hours per worker are allowed
to vary. As argued by Trigari herself, that diﬀerence makes the elasticity of marginal cost
to output larger in the New Keynesian model, which accounts for the weaker and less
persistent response of output in the latter case.
46in both cases. Combined with a small inﬂuence (in the same direction) on
the response of the labor force, the impact of price stickiness on the response
of unemployment to the technology shock is almost negligible.40 The only
sizable impact of price stickiness appears to be on the response of the real
wage, which declines considerably as a result of the large rise in the markup
of ﬁnal goods ﬁrms that results from their failure to lower prices to match
the decline in the price of intermediate goods. This is reﬂected in a muted
rise in the marginal revenue product of intermediate goods ﬁrms and, as a
result, on the wage.
4.5 The Role of Wage Stickiness
Finally, I turn to an examination of the role played by wage stickiness in
shaping the responses of the economy with labor market frictions to mon-
etary and technology shocks. Figures 6a and 6b display, respectively, the
simulated responses to those shocks. For each type of shock, responses un-
der two alternative calibrations are displayed. The solid line corresponds to
an economy with ﬂexible prices ( =0 ), whereas the starred line assumes
 =0 75, implying an average duration of wages of one year. In both cases
prices are assumed to be sticky.
As Figure 6a makes clear, the presence of sticky wages strengthens sub-
stantially the eﬀects of a monetary policy shock on economic activity. In
particular, the decline in output and employment is roughly twice as large
as in the case of ﬂexible wages. Since the response of the labor force is
hardly aﬀected, the resulting increase in unemployment is also much larger.
40See Andrés et al. (2006) for a similar exercise in a model with endogenous capital
accumulation, price indexation, endogenous match destruction. Their ﬁndings point to
a stronger role for price rigidities in accounting for the volatility of vacancies relative to
unemployment, but no so much for the volatility of unemployment itself, which goes down
slightly when stronger price rigidities are assumed.
47In addition, and not surprisingly, we see how the average real wage shows a
much smoother response in the presence of staggered contracts, leading to
less downward pressure on marginal costs and, as a result, a smaller decline
in inﬂation.
The impact of wage stickiness on the responses to a technology shock is
also substantial, as shown in Figure 6b. In particular, the negative response
of employment is now larger, and that of the labor force (slightly) smaller.
This is suﬃcient for the response of the unemployment rate to switch its sign,
and thus to rise in response to a positive technology shock. Once again, that
implication contrasts with the prediction of real models with labor market
frictions (e.g. Shimer (2005)), but is consistent with the evidence presented
in Section 2.
Note also that the introduction of sticky wages dampens the response of
the real wage even further in the short run, driving closer to the near-zero
short run response uncovered by the empirical evidence in Section 2.
As discussed above, the presence of labor market frictions, by itself, does
not appear to have much impact on the economy’s response to shocks. The
indirect impact is, however, more substantial to the extent that it justiﬁes
the presence of sticky wages in equilibrium.
Having looked at some of the positive predictions of the model under
alternative sets of assumptions, I turn next to its normative implications.
5 Labor Market Frictions, Nominal Rigidities and
Monetary Policy Design
I start this section by describing the constrained-eﬃcient allocation, and
then turn my attention to the optimal design of monetary policy in the
48presence of labor market frictions and nominal rigidities. Ultimately, the
purpose of the analysis is to shed light on how the existence of unemployment
and wage rigidities should inﬂuence the conduct of monetary policy.
5.1 The Social Planner’s Problem













subject to the resource constraint
 + Γ

  = 1−

and the deﬁnitions
 =  + 




In contrast with ﬁrms and households, the social planner internalizes the
impact of its hiring and participation decisions on the job ﬁnding rate 
and, hence, of the hiring cost. The optimality conditions characterizing the
resulting constrained-eﬃcient allocation are given by






where  ≡ (1 − )−
 is the marginal product of labor and, as
above,  ≡ 

 is the marginal disutility of labor market eﬀort,
expressed in terms of the ﬁnal consumption bundle.
495.1.1 The Eﬃcient Steady State
Evaluated at the steady state, the previous two eﬃciency conditions take
the form:
(1 + )(1 − (1 − )) Γ =( 1− )− −  (55)
(1 − ) = Γ1+ (56)
By comparing (55)-(56) with the corresponding steady state conditions
of the decentralized economy (49)-(50), it is easy to see that the latter’s
steady state will be eﬃcient whenever
M(1 − ) (57)
and
(1 + )=1 (58)
In words, condition (57) requires that the subsidy on the purchases of
intermediate goods should exactly oﬀset the impact of ﬁrms’ market power,
as reﬂected in the desired gross markup M. Condition (58) is a version of
the Hosios condition similar to the one derived in Blanchard and Galí (2010).
It involves an inverse relation between ﬁrms’ relative bargaining power, ,
and the elasticity of hiring costs, . That inverse relation captures the neg-
ative externality (in the form of larger hiring costs) caused by ﬁrms’ hiring
decisions, and the positive externality resulting from higher participation
(in the form of reduced hiring costs). The stronger are these externalities
(corresponding to a larger ), the lower is the relative bargaining power of
ﬁrms (the smaller )c o n s i s t e n tw i t ha ne ﬃcient allocation, since the implied
higher wages would induce fewer hires and more participation.
505.2 Optimal Monetary Policy
For simplicity, and throughout this section, I maintain the assumption of a
constrained-eﬃcient steady state, i.e. conditions (57) and (58) are assumed
to hold. The assumption of an eﬃcient steady state is often made in the
literature on optimal monetary policy, for in that case the latter focuses
exclusively on oﬀsetting (or at least alleviating) the consequences of ineﬃ-
cient ﬂuctuations in response to shocks.41 Like before, I consider the two
scenarios of ﬂe x i b l ea n ds t i c k yw a g e si nt u r n .
5.2.1 The Case of Flexible Wages
Under the assumption of period-by-period Nash bargaining of wages ana-
lyzed in Section 4.1, it is easy to check that the optimal monetary policy
corresponds to a strategy of strict inﬂation targeting, i.e. full stabilization
of the price level. To see this, note from (9) that under that policy the
markup of ﬁnal goods ﬁrms will remain constant and equal to the desired
level, i.e. 
 = M(1 −),f o ra l l. Combined with assumption (57), it
follows that  =  =( 1 −)−
 for all  Thus, and imposing
(58), one can easily check that equilibrium conditions (23) and (24) match
exactly the eﬃciency conditions (53) and (54). In other words, the resulting
equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient.
Intuitively, under assumptions (57) and (58), the equilibrium of an econ-
omy in which both prices and (Nash bargained) wages are ﬂexible involves
ac o n s t r a i n e d - e ﬃcient allocation. Under ﬂexible wages, a monetary policy
that succeeds in fully stabilizing the price level replicates that natural alloca-
tion, and is thus optimal. That policy can be implemented with the assumed
41See Woodford (2003) and Galí (2008) for a discussion of these issues in the context of
the New Keynesian model without frictions.
51interest rate rule by choosing an arbitrarily large coeﬃcient .T h a te n v i -
ronment is thus characterized by what Blanchard and Galí (2007) refer to
as "the divine coincidence," i.e. the absence of a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation
stabilization and the attainment of an eﬃcient allocation: one implies the
other.
The previous ﬁnding hinges on the eﬃciency of the ﬂexible price equilib-
rium allocation, guaranteed by assumptions (57)-(58). Faia (2009) analyzes
the optimal policy in a related model (i.e. one with labor market frictions,
sticky prices, and ﬂexible wages), while relaxing the assumption of eﬃciency
of the ﬂexible price allocation. She shows that in that case it is optimal for
the central bank to deviate from a policy of strict inﬂation targeting, though
the size of the deviations implied by her calibrated model are quantitatively
small.
5.2.2 The Case of Sticky Wages
As is well know from the analysis of Erceg et al. (2001) and others, when
both prices and wages are sticky it is generally be impossible for the central
bank to replicate the constrained-eﬃcient equilibrium allocation, which un-
der assumptions (57)-(58) corresponds to the equilibrium allocation in the
absence of nominal rigidities (the natural allocation, for short), as discussed
above. The intuition behind that result is straightforward: in response to
real shocks the real wage will generally adjust in the equilibrium with ﬂexible
prices and wages, and that adjustment will be necessary to support the re-
sulting (constrained-eﬃcient) allocation. Of course, any adjustment of the
real wage requires some variation in either the price level or the nominal
wage. But in the presence of sticky prices and wages such variations will
occur only in response to deviations of average price markups and/or aver-
52age real wages from their natural counterparts (see equations (9) and (40)),
from which it follows that the natural (and eﬃcient, under my assumptions)
allocation will not be attainable.
In order to determine the optimal policy in that context I start by deriv-
ing a second order approximation to the representative household’s utility
losses caused by deviations from the constrained eﬃcient allocation due to
the presence of nominal rigidities. In so doing I restrict myself to the case
of small ﬂuctuations around the eﬃcient steady state. As derived in Appen-
dix 4, the loss function takes the following form (expressed in terms of the




























where e  ≡  − 
 and e  ≡  − 
 are, respectively, the output and
unemployment gaps relative to their natural counterparts (where the latter
are deﬁned as their equilibrium values under ﬂexible prices and wages);
∗
 ≡ (1−)(1−) is inversely related to the degree of wage rigidities
;a n d1 − Ω ≡ 
 =1−
(1+)
 is the steady state gap between the
marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor resulting
f r o mt h ee x i s t e n c eo fl a b o rm a r k e tf r i c t i o n s . N o t et h a ti nt h ea b s e n c eo f
labor market frictions and under ﬂexible wages ∗
 →∞ , Ω =0 ,  =0and
 =1, so the previous loss function collapses to the one familiar from
the basic New Keynesian model.42
The presence of labor market frictions has two implications for the wel-
fare criterion. First, to the extent that they are accompanied by staggered
42See the expression in p. 81 in Galí (2008), under  =1 .
53nominal wage setting, ﬂuctuations in wage inﬂation will generate welfare
losses due to the implied dispersion in wages and the resulting losses from
an ineﬃcient allocation of labor across ﬁrms.43 Note that here the size of
the welfare losses resulting from any given departure from wage stability
is (i) increasing in 1 − Φ (which measures the weight of wages in the total
cost of employing a new worker), (ii) decreasing in the degree of diminish-
ing returns to labor  (for the latter dampens the extent of employment
dispersion caused by any given level of wage dispersion) and (iii) increasing
i nt h ed e g r e eo fw a g es t i c k i n e s s (which determines the degree of wage
dispersion caused by a given deviation from zero wage inﬂation).
Secondly, and to the extent that 0, the welfare criterion above
points to a speciﬁcr o l ef o ru n e m p l o y m e n tg a pﬂuctuations as a source of
welfare losses, beyond that associated with variations in the output gap
(or the employment gap, which by construction is proportional to output
gap). That role is related to the fact that unemployment is a component of
eﬀective labor market eﬀort, and that ﬂuctuations in the latter (relative to its
eﬃcient benchmark) generate disutility. The importance of unemployment
ﬂuctuations is thus increasing in  and , which determine the weight of
unemployment in the total disutility from market eﬀort.
The equilibrium allocation under the optimal monetary policy can be
determined by minimizing (59) subject to the log-linearized equilibrium con-
ditions listed in Appendix 2 (excluding the Taylor rule). Figure 7.displays
the equilibrium responses to a technology shock of the same variables con-
sidered earlier, under the optimal policy. For the sake of comparison it also
43By contrast, in the monopoly union model of Erceg et al. (2000) the welfare losses
from wage inﬂation are a consequence of the distorted allocation of employment across
labor types within each ﬁrm, resulting from dispersion in their wages caused by staggered
wage setting.
54displays the corresponding responses under the Taylor rule used above. The
simulation is based on a calibration with stickiness in both prices and wages.
Note that the optimal response implies some deviation from price stability.
In particular it requires a temporary decline in inﬂation, which makes it
possible for the real wage to adjust upward with a smaller upward adjust-
ment of nominal wages.44 It also allows for a stronger accommodation of
t h ei n c r e a s ei np r o d u c t i v i t y ,a sr e ﬂected in the larger positive response of
output. In accordance, employment is allowed to rise, and unemployment
to decline. Note also that the optimal policy is associated with a smaller
decline in inﬂation than the Taylor rule. Despite the greater price stability,
the cumulative response of the real wage is stronger under the optimal pol-
icy, which requires positive wage inﬂation (not shown) in contrast with the
wage deﬂation associated with the equilibrium under the Taylor rule.
Is there a simple interest rate rule that the central bank could follow
that would improve on the assumed Taylor rule? In order to answer that
question I compute the optimal rule among the class of interest rate rules
of the form:
 =  + 

 + b  + 
 + 
where I have added wage inﬂation and the unemployment rate as arguments,
relative to the conventional Taylor rule. The coeﬃcients that minimize the
households welfare loss, determined by iterating over all possible conﬁgura-
tions, are  =1 51,  = −010,  =0 01 and  = −0025.F i g u r e 8
summarizes the dynamic response of the economy under that optimal sim-
ple rule, and compares it to the corresponding responses under the fully
optimal policy. As the ﬁgure makes clear the diﬀerences between the two
44See Thomas (2008) for a related result in the context of a similar model.
55are practically negligible. Note that relative to the standard Taylor rule,
the optimized simple rule calls for further accommodation of supply-driven
output variation and also puts some weight on stabilization of unemploy-
ment. Interestingly, the optimal coeﬃcient on price inﬂation is very close
to 15, the value often assumed in standard calibrations of the Taylor rule
(following Taylor (1993)). Perhaps more surprisingly, the weight on wage
inﬂation is close to zero. This is in contrast with the ﬁndings in Erceg et al.
(2000), where stabilization of wage inﬂation emerges as a highly desirable
policy from a welfare viewpoint.45 On the other hand, the desirability of
a systematic policy response to unemployment ﬂuctuations is in line with
the ﬁndings on optimal simple rules in Blanchard and Galí (2009) and Faia
(2009).
Given the relatively small values of the coeﬃcients on variables other
than price inﬂation in the optimized interest rate rule, a rule of the form
 =  +1 5

 leads to technology shock responses (not shown) that are
similar to those generated by the optimized one. That rule can be interpreted
as capturing the notion of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, whereby central banks
seek to attain a pre-speciﬁed inﬂation target only gradually ("in the medium
term," using the language of the ECB), as opposed to the strict inﬂation
targeting that is optimal in environments in which price stickiness is the
only nominal distortion.
The previous ﬁndings are consistent, at least in a qualitative sense, with
the existing literature on optimal monetary policy in environments with la-
bor market frictions and wage rigidities, despite the diﬀerences in modelling
45The structure of the present model and the associated ineﬃciencies resulting from
wage dispersion lead to a coeﬃcient on wage volatility in the loss function that is about
one-third the size of the coeﬃcient on price inﬂation. That ranking is reversed for standard
calibrations of the Erceg et al (2000) model.
56details. This is the case, in particular, for Blanchard and Galí (2010) (in
a model with real wage rigidities) and Thomas (2008) (in a model with
staggered nominal wage setting like the present one).
6 Possible Extensions
As argued in the introduction, it is not the goal of the present paper to oﬀer
an exhaustive analysis of existing models of monetary policy and unem-
ployment. Instead, I have developed and analyzed a relatively streamlined
model, but one which in my view contains the key ingredients to illustrate
the consequences of the coexistence of nominal rigidities and labor market
frictions. The model is, however, suﬃciently ﬂexible to be able to accom-
modate many extensions that can already be found in the literature. A list
of some of those extensions, with a brief description of ways to introduce
them, but without any further analysis, follows.
Real wage rigidities and wage indexation. As emphasized by Blan-
chard and Galí (2007, 2009) the presence of real wage rigidities may have
implications for the optimal design of monetary policy that are likely to
diﬀer from the ones generated by a model with nominal wage rigidities only
(like the one emphasized here). Among other things, in the presence of
real wage rigidities, the policymaker cannot use price inﬂation to facilitate
the adjustment of real wages. A simple way to introduce real wage rigidities
would be to allow for (possibly partial) wage indexation to contemporaneous
wage inﬂation between wage renegotiations. Formally, one can assume:
+|| = +−1| (++−1)
for  =1 23and | = ∗
 ,a n dw h e r e+|| is the nominal wage in
period + for an employment relationship whose wage was last renegotiated
57in period . Note that parameter  ∈ [01] measures the degree of indexation.
An alternative speciﬁcation, often used in the New Keynesian literature (e.g.
Smets and Wouters (2007)) and adopted by Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008),
assumes instead indexation to past inﬂation. Formally,
+|| = +−1| (+−1+−2)
for  =1 23In the latter case, even with full indexation, price inﬂation
can still be used to speed up the adjustment of real wage to shocks that
warrant such an adjustment, due to the lags in indexation.
Greater wage ﬂexibility for new hires. As discussed above, a num-
ber of authors (Haefke et al. (2007), Pissarides (2008), Carneiro et al.
(2008)) have argued that while the wages of incumbent workers display some
clear rigidities, the latter may not have allocative consequences (to the ex-
tent they remain within the bargaining set) since the wage that determines
hiring decision is the wage of new hires, which is likely to be more ﬂexible,
according to some evidence Even though that evidence remains controver-
sial and has been disputed in some quarters (see references above), it may
be of interest to see how such diﬀerential ﬂexibility can be introduced in the
model, and to explore its positive and normative implications. A tractable
and ﬂexible way of introducing that feature, proposed in Bodart et al (2006),
involves the assumption that new hires at a ﬁrm are paid either the aver-
age wage (with probability ) or a freely negotiated wage (with probability
1−). Parameter  is thus an index of the degree of relative wage ﬂexibility
for new hires. That assumption would require a change in the equation de-
scribing the value of unemployment, since the probability of bargaining over
wage at the time of being hired would now be 1 − , instead of 1 − .
One could then quantify the extent to which the responses to shocks and
58the optimal policy vary with .
Smaller wealth eﬀects. The analysis above has relied on a speciﬁ-
cation of utility with wealth eﬀects of labor supply that are likely to be
implausible large. That could explain the unusual unrealistic behavior of
the labor force under some of the calibrations discussed above. One way to
get around that problem is to assume the following alternative speciﬁcation
of the utility function, originally proposed in Galí (2010):46












and  ∈ [01]. In that case the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and market eﬀort is given (in logs) by
 =  + 
where  =( 1− ) + −1. Thus, changes in consumption will have an
arbitrarily small eﬀect on the short-run supply for market eﬀort, if  is close
to unity. Given that the gap between  and  is stationary (even when 
displays a linear trend or a unit root), the previous speciﬁcation of utility
will still be consistent with a balanced growth path.
Other demand shocks. The analysis of optimal monetary policy above
assumes the economy faces only a technology shock (naturally, the mone-
tary policy shock is turned oﬀ for the purposes of that exercise). How the
46See Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008) for an alternative speciﬁcation of utility in the same
spirit.
59policy implications may vary once a shock other than technology is intro-
duced seems worthy of investigation. In particular, it may be the case that
in that scenario the optimal policy will attach a greater weight to output
stabilization.47
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Over the past few years a growing number of researchers have turned their
attention towards the development and analysis of extensions of the New
Keynesian framework that model unemployment explicitly. The present
paper has described some of the essential ingredients and properties of those
models, and their implications for monetary policy.
The analysis of a calibrated version of the model developed here suggests
that labor market frictions are unlikely, either by themselves or through
their interaction with sticky prices, to have large eﬀects on the equilibrium
response to shocks, in an economy with nominal rigidities and a monetary
policy described by a simple Taylor type rule. In that respect, perhaps the
most important contribution of those frictions lies in their ability to reconcile
the presence of wage rigidities with privately eﬃcient employment relations.
The presence of those nominal wage rigidities has, on the other hand, impor-
tant consequences for the economy ’s response to shocks as well as for the
optimal design of monetary policy. Thus, in the model developed above, the
optimal policy allows for signiﬁcant deviations from price stability, in order
to facilitate the adjustment of real wages to real shocks. Furthermore, the
outcome of that policy can be approximated by means of a simple interest
rate rule that responds to both price inﬂation and the unemployment rate.
47Sveen and Weinke (2008) make a forceful case for the importance of demand shocks
in accounting for labor market dynamics.
60References
Andrés, Javier, Rafael Domenech, and Javier Ferri (2006): “Price Rigid-
ity and the Volatility of Vacancies and Unemployment,” mimeo, Universidad
de Valencia.
Arseneau, David M. and Sanjay K. Chugh (2008): "Optimal Fiscal and
Monetary Policy with Costly Wage Bargaining," Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 55 (8), 1401-1414.
Barnichon, Régis (2008): "Productivity, Aggregate Demand and Unem-
ployment Fluctuations," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-47,
Federal Reserve Board.
Barattieri, Alessandro, Susanto Basu, and Peter Gottschalk (2009): "Some
Evidence on the Importance of Sticky Wages," Boston College, mimeo.
Barro, Robert J. (1977): "Long Term Contracting, Sticky Prices and
Monetary Policy," Journal of Monetary Economics 3(3), 305-316.
Basu, Susanto, John Fernald, and Miles Kimball (2006): “Are Technol-
ogy Improvements Contractionary?,” American Economic Review, vol. 96,
no. 5, 1418-1448.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Jordi Galí (2007): “Real Wage Rigidities and
the New Keynesian Model,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, sup-
plement to volume 39, no. 1, 35-66.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Jordi Galí (2010): “Labor Markets and Mon-
etary Policy: A New Keynesian Model with Unemployment,” American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, forthcoming.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Danny Quah (1989): "The Dynamic Eﬀects of
Aggregate Demand and Supply Disturbances," American Economic Review
79(4), 655-673.
61Bodart, Vincent, Gregory de Walque, Olivier Pierrard, Henri Sneessens,
and Raf Wouters (2006): "Nominal Wage Rigidities in a New Keynesian
Model with Frictional Unemployment," mimeo.
Calvo, Guillermo (1983): “Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximizing
Framework,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 383-398.
Carneiro, Anabela, Paulo Guimaraes and Pedro Portugal (2008): "Real
wages and the business cycle: Accounting for worker and ﬁrm heterogene-
ity," mimeo.
Chari, V.V., Parick J. Kehoe, and Ellen McGrattan (2008): "Are Struc-
tural VARs with Long-Run Restrictions Useful in Developing Business Cycle
Theory?," Journal of Monetary Economics 55 (8), 1337-1352.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Robert Vigfusson
(2003): "What Happens after a Technology Shock?" NBER WP# 9819.
Christoﬀel, Kai, and Tobias Linzert (2005): “The Role of Real Wage
Rigidities and Labor Market Frictions for Unemployment and Inﬂation Dy-
namics,” Discussion Paper 556, European Central Bank.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler (1999): “The Science
of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective,” Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 37, 1661-1707.
Diamond, Peter A. (1982a): "Aggregate Demand Management in Search
Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy 90, 881-894.
Diamond, Peter A. (1982b): "Wage Determination and Eﬃciency in
Search Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies 49, 217-227.
Dickens, William T., Lorenz Goette, Erica L. Groshen, Steinar Holden,
Julian Messina, Mark E. Schweitzer, Jarkko Turunen, and Melanie E. Ward
(2007): "How Wages Change: Micro Evidence from the International Wage
Flexibility Project," Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2), 195-214.
62Erceg, Christopher J., Dale W. Henderson, and Andrew T. Levin (2000):
“Optimal Monetary Policy with Staggered Wage and Price Contracts,” Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics vol. 46, no. 2, 281-314.
European Central Bank (2009): "Wage Dynamics in Europe: Final Re-
port of the Wage Dynamics Network" at http://www.ecb.int/home/html/researcher_wdn.en.html
Faia, Ester (2008): "Optimal Monetary Policy Rules in a Model with
Labor Market Frictions," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 32(5),
1600-1621.
Faia, Ester (2009): "Ramsey Monetary Policy with Labor Market Fric-
tions," Journal of Monetary Economics 56, 570-581.
Francis, Neville, and Valerie Ramey (2005): “Is the Technology-Driven
Real Business Cycle Hypothesis Dead? Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations
Revisited,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 52, issue 8,1379-1399.
Galí, Jordi (1999): “Technology, Employment, and the Business Cycle:
Do Technology Shocks Explain Aggregate Fluctuations?,” American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 89, no. 1, 249-271.
Galí, Jordi and Pau Rabanal (2004): “Technology Shocks and Aggregate
Fluctuations: How Well Does the RBC Model Fit Postwar U.S. Data?,”
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2004, 225-288.
Galí, Jordi and Mark Gertler (1999): “Inﬂation Dynamics: A Structural
Econometric Analysis,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 44, no. 2,
195-222.
Galí, Jordi, Mark Gertler, David López-Salido (2001): “European Inﬂa-
tion Dynamics,” European Economic Review vol. 45, no. 7, 1237-1270.
Galí, Jordi (2008): Monetary Policy, Inﬂation, and the Business Cycle.
An Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework, Princeton University
Press (Princeton, NJ).
63Galí, Jordi (2010): "The Return of the Wage Phillips Curve," unpub-
lished manuscript.
Galí, Jordi and Thijs van Rens (2009): "The Vanishing Procyclicality of
Labor Productivity," unpublished manuscript.
Galuscak, Kamil, Alan Murphy, Daphne Nicolitsas, Frank Smets, Pawel
Strzelecki, and Matija Vodopivec (2008): "The Determination of Wages of
Newly Hired Workers: Survey Evidence on Internal vs. External Factors,"
mimeo.
Gertler, Mark, Luca Sala, and Antonella Trigari (2008): "An Estimated
Monetary DSGE Model with Unemployment and Staggered Nominal Wage
Setting," J o u r n a lo fM o n e y ,C r e d i ta n dB a n k i n g40(8), 1713-1764.
Gertler, Mark, and Antonella Trigari (2009), “Unemployment Fluctua-
tions with Staggered Nash Wage Bargaining,” Journal of Political Economy
117 (1), 38-86.
Goodfriend, Marvin and Robert G. King (1997): "The New Neoclassical
Synthesis and the Role of Monetary Policy," NBER Macroeconomics Annual,
231-282.
Haefke, Christian, Marcus Sonntag, and Thijs van Rens (2008): "Wage
Rigidity and Job Creation," unpublished manuscript.
Hagedorn, Marcus and Iourii Manovskii (2008): "The Cyclical Behavior
of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies Revisited," American Eco-
nomic Review 98(4), 1692-1706.
Hall, Robert (2005): "Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage
Stickiness," American Economic Review vol. 95, no. 1, 50-64.
Jaimovich, Nir and Segio Rebelo (2009): "Can News about the Future
Drive the Business Cycle?," American Economics Review 99 (4), 1097-1118.
Krause, Michael, Thomas Lubik (2007): "The (Ir)relevance of Real Wage
64rigidities in the New Keynesian Model with Search Frictions," Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol. 54, no.3, 706-727.
Krause, Michael, David López-Salido, and Thomas A. Lubik (2008): "In-
ﬂation Dynamics with Search Frictions: A Structural Econometric Analy-
sis," Journal of Monetary Economics 55 (5), 892-916.
Krueger, Alan B. and Andreas Mueller (2008): "The Lot of the Unem-
ployed: A Time Use Perspective," IZA Discussion Paper no. 3490.
Kuester, Keith (2007): "Real Price and Wage Rigidities in a Model with
Matching Frictions," European Central Bank Working Paper Series no. 720.
Merz, Monica (1995), “Search in the Labor Market and the Real Business
Cycle”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 36, 269-300
Mortensen, Dale T. (1982a): "The Matching Process as a Noncoopera-
tive/Bargaining Game," in J. McCall (ed.), The economics of Information
and Uncertainty, University of Chicago Press (Chicago, IL), 233-254.
Mortensen, Dale T. (1982b): "Property Rights and Eﬃciency in Mating,
Racing and Related Games," American Economic Review 72, 968-979.
Nakamura, Emi and Jón Steinsson (2008): Five Facts About Prices: A
Reevaluation of Menu Cost Models, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(4),
1415-1464.
Pissarides, Christopher (1984): "Search Intensity, Job advertising and
Eﬃciency," Journal of Labor Economics 2, 128-143.
Pissarides, Christopher (2000): Equilibrium Unemployment Theory,M I T
Press.
Pissarides, Christopher (2009): "The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle:
Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?," Econometrica 77 (5), 1339-1369.
Rotemberg, Julio and Michael Woodford (1999): “Interest Rate Rules
in an Estimated Sticky Price Model,” in J.B. Taylor ed., Monetary Policy
65Rules,U n i v e r s i t yo fC h i c a g oP r e s s .
Sbordone, Argia (2002): “Prices and Unit Labor Costs: Testing Models
of Pricing Behavior,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 45, no. 2, 265-
292.
Shimer, Robert (2005): “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unem-
ployment and Vacancies,” American Economic Review vol. 95, no. 1, 25-49.
Shimer, Robert (2009): Labor Markets and Business Cycles, Princeton
University Press (Princeton, NJ), forthcoming.
Silva, José and Manuel Toledo (2009): "Labor Turnover Costs and the
Cyclical Behavior of Vacancies and Unemployment," Macroeconomic Dy-
namics 13 (Supplement 1), 76-96.
Sveen, Tommy and Lutz Weinke (2008): "New Keynesian Perspectives
on Labor Market Dynamics," Journal of Monetary Economics 55 (5), 921-
930.
Taylor, John B. (1993): “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,”
Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214.
Taylor, John B. (1999): “Staggered Price and Wage Setting in Macro-
economics,” in J.B. Taylor and M. Woodford eds., Handbook of Macroeco-
nomics, chapter 15, 1341-1397, Elsevier, New York.
Taylor, John B. (1999): “An Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy
Rules,” in J.B. Taylor ed., Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago
Press.
Thomas, Carlos (2008a): "Search and Matching Frictions and Optimal
Monetary Policy," Journal of Monetary Economics 55 (5), 936-956.
Thomas, Carlos (2008b): "Search Frictions, Real Rigidities and Inﬂation
Dynamics," Banco de España, working paper 2008-06
Trigari, Antonella (2006): “The Role of Search Frictions and Bargaining
66in Inﬂation Dynamics,” mimeo.
Trigari, Antonella (2009): "Equilibrium Unemployment, Job Flows, and
Inﬂation Dynamics," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 41 (1), 1-33.
Walsh, Carl (2003a): Monetary Theory and Policy,M I TP r e s s( C a m -
bridge, MA).
Walsh, Carl (2003b): “Labor Market Search and Monetary Shocks”, in S.
Altug, J. Chadha and C. Nolan (eds.) Elements of Dynamic Macroeconomic
Analysis, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, UK), 451-486.
Walsh, Carl (2005): “Labor Market Search, Sticky Prices, and Interest
Rate Rules”, Review of Economic Dynamics, 8, 829-849
Woodford, Michael (2003): Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory
of Monetary Policy, Princeton University Press.
Yun, Tack (1996): “Nominal Price Rigidity, Money Supply Endogeneity,










































































2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.5









2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.5









2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.2
-0.1
2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.2











2 4 6 8 10 12
0.2
0.4











2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.25
-0.2













2 4 6 8 10 12
0.2
0.4










2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.3
-0.2






























2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.08
2 4 6 8 10 12











2 4 6 8 10 12
0.2
0.4










2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.3
-0.2












2 4 6 8 10 12
0.2
0.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 2 4 6 8 10 12Figure 4a. The Role of Labor Market Frictions











2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.2












2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.2












2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.2
-0.15





frictionsFigure 4b. The Role of Labor Market Frictions





























2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.08














2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.4
-0.3
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.2Figure 5a. The Role of Price Stickiness













2468 1 0 1 2
-0.2 













2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.2










2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.4
-0.3
2 4 6 8 10 12
-1.5
-1 f lex p
sticky pFigure 5b. The Role of Price Stickiness
Flexible Wages, Technology Shock










2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.5















2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.05











2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.4
-0.3
2 4 6 8 10 12
0Figure 6a. The Role of Wage Stickiness







2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.2
2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.1
0











2 4 6 8 10 12
 












2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.2
2 4 6 8 10 12
-1.5
f lex w
sticky wFigure 6b. The Role of Wage Stickiness


























2 4 6 8 10 12
0.25














2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.4
-0.3
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.2
 Figure 7. Monetary Policy Design: Optimal vs. Taylor  












2468 1 0 1 2
0












2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.3














2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.4
-0.2
2 4 6 8 10 12
0.2
0.4
 Figure 8. Monetary Policy Design: Optimal vs. Optimal Simple  











2468 1 0 1 2
0











2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.05











2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.15
-0.1
2 4 6 8 10 12
0.2
0.4
 
Optimal
Opt. Simple